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I. Introduction  
The concept of censure is central to two influential theories, both developed at the University 
of Cambridge in the 1980s and 1990s. On the one hand, there is Colin Sumner’s ambitious 
attempt to reconstruct the theoretical foundations of the discipline of criminology by 
replacing the sociology of deviance with a sociology of censure.1 On the other hand, there is 
Andreas von Hirsch’s development of a theory of punishment and criminal law that was also 
organised around the central concept of censure. A I shall show, both theories can be read as 
responses to the decline of penal-welfarism and to the shifts in penal policy and practice that 
accompanied the rise of neo-liberalism in this period. However, in spite of this, and the fact 
that they share the central concept of censure, it is curious that they do not engage with each 
other. Sumner’s account is sociological; von Hirsch’s is normative. The former opens up the 
possibility of a social account of criminal law and punishment that is linked to economic and 
political institutions; the latter is concerned with the fairness of individual punishment, 
seeking to engage with normative dimensions of censure and disapproval and to articulate the 
grounds on which censure, and thus punishment, might be justified. Thus, while the two 
theories are both concerned with crime and punishment, they talk past each other and make 
no attempt to engage with the other. In this paper, then, I want to explore the possible 
relationships, if any, between the two concepts of censure and to look at whether the concept 
of censure might be used in a way which brings the two approaches closer together. 
 
II. A Sociology of Censure 
Sumner’s distinctive account aims at a reconstruction of criminology as a sociology of 
censure.2 This is comprised of two interconnected strands, one rooted in his work on a 
Marxist concept of ideology and the other in a historical analysis of the sociology of 
deviance.  
The first strand was developed in Sumner’s work from the 1970s onwards – in part as 
a critique of the (at the time) dominant sociology of deviance, and also in an engagement 
with strands of radical criminology which variously sought to construct, or to reject the 
possibility of, a Marxist theory of crime and deviance.3 Sumner argued that the underlying 
problem with the sociology of deviance, and with Marxist attempts to radicalise the analysis 
of deviance, was that it treated ‘deviance’ and crime as though they were objective social 
                                                 
* I would like to thank Sarah Armstrong for her comments on an earlier draft. 
1 C Sumner, The Sociology of Deviance. An Obituary (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994) 
2 See e.g. C Sumner, “Marxism and Deviancy Theory” in P Wiles (ed), The Sociology of Crime and 
Delinquency in Britain (London: Martin Robertson, 1976); C Sumner (ed), Censure, Politics and Criminal 
Justice (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990); “The Social Nature of Crime and Deviance” in Sumner 
(ed), The Blackwell Companion to Criminology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). I have greatly benefited from 
reading D Moxon, “Marxism and the Definition of Crime” (2011) 5(2) In-Spire Journal of Law, Politics and 
Society 102-20. 
3 See I Taylor, P Walton & J Young, The New Criminology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973); See also 
essays in I Taylor, P Walton & J Young (eds.), Critical Criminology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).  
These are discussed in Sumner, Sociology of Deviance, ch.10. 
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categories. This meant that the discipline of criminology was thrown onto investigating the 
characteristics of criminals or ‘deviants’ in order to explain the phenomenon of crime, rather 
than looking at the way that the categories of deviance or crime were themselves constructed 
and deployed.4 These categories, he argued, were based on an implicit claim to moral and 
political consensus, against which deviance was to be judged. Thus, rather than focusing on 
the behaviour or conduct, it was important to focus on the means by which the consensus – 
the dominant moral or political code – was constructed and thus how certain behaviours come 
to be labelled as deviant. If there was no underlying reality of crime or deviance, what these 
concepts had in common was that they were conduct that had been labelled as such by the 
state. This required a recognition that criminal or moral judgments were not based on any 
objective reality, but reflected social and class conflicts over meaning. Thus, as Stuart Hall 
and his collaborators famously argued, the category of mugging was deployed in the early 
1970s by state and media as a form of censure which enabled a new kind of ‘law and order’ 
politics.5 From this perspective, then, deviance was to be understood as an ideological 
concept, in the sense that it was used as a way of producing a particular world view that 
reflected class interests, and that therefore the way forward was to use a theory of ideology as 
a means of developing the analysis.6 The concept of censure was thus intended to open up 
historical and sociological analysis of the way that judgments about deviancy were made, 
about the meaning of conduct to the participants, and of the kind of social, political and 
economic interests that censures represented. Censures were thus defined as “negative 
ideological categories with specific historical application”.7 
The second strand is most clearly articulated in his book The Sociology of Deviance: 
An Obituary (1994), in which Sumner argued that the sociology of deviance is tied to a 
particular governmental project, itself connected to the development and decline of the 
welfare state.8 The origins of the sociology of deviance were traced to the foundational work 
of Emile Durkheim, which while recognising deviance as a social phenomenon also saw the 
role of the state as being that of managing and controlling deviance. This governmental 
project then developed over the course of the twentieth century as deviancy theory was 
connected to institutional developments in criminal justice and ‘corrections’. However, 
Sumner argues that the study of deviancy ran its course as both an intellectual and a 
governmental project in the 1960s and 1970s as the post-World War Two consensus 
unravelled. The intellectual unravelling began with the work of those such as Matza who 
questioned taking deviancy as the central category of analysis and focused instead on the role 
of the state (or state actors) in defining deviant conduct and the building of ‘deviant’ 
identities – in particular in relation to forms of ‘deviant’ conduct such as drug taking or 
homosexuality.9 Once it was recognised that ideas about deviancy relied on an implicit 
account of a dominant normative order, it was essential to study how that order itself was 
created. For those following Matza, the study of deviancy thus increasingly shifted from the 
nature of the conduct or ‘deviants’ themselves to the bodies or processes that defined or 
labelled conduct as deviant. Sumner then goes on to argue that this contradiction between the 
                                                 
4 See Sociology of Deviance, pp.309-10 for a summary discussion of the weaknesses of category of deviance. 
5 S Hall et al, Policing the Crisis. Mugging, the State and Law and Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1978). 
6 Building on his analysis in Reading Ideologies. An Investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law 
(London: Academic Press, 1979) 
7 Sumner, “Rethinking Deviance. Towards a Sociology of Censure” in Sumner (ed), Censure, Politics and 
Criminal Justice (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990) p.26. See also Sumner, The Sociology of 
Deviance, p.303. 
8 Supra n.1. See also “Censure, Culture and Political Economy. Beyond the Death of Deviance Debate” in S 
Hall & S Winlow (eds), New Directions in Criminological Theory (London: Routledge, 2012). 
9 D Matza, Becoming Deviant (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969). 
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ameliorative project of the sociology of deviance and state power became even more stark as 
the welfare state was dismantled, with criminal law being used more nakedly as the exercise 
of class power. In the absence of a clear shared normative order, criminal law in a neo-liberal 
order stands revealed as the censure or blaming of conducts that are threatening to social 
order or morally disapproved of by the dominant socio-economic classes. Here censure seems 
to have a more specific historical character:  
“If the 1960s were a time of deviance, in thought and in action, this new century is a 
time of censure both in thought and in action.”10 
Censure here takes the form of indiscriminate blaming for political purposes to buttress the 
power of the state or particular social groups: “the eighties marked a return to an older set of 
judgments about wickedness and its fiscal cost.”11 This socio-historical account of censure 
thus not only seeks to demonstrate how particular censuring practices are organised around 
particular themes and the way that these themselves are linked to particular political projects, 
but also identifies ‘censure’ as a practice specific to the neo-liberal state. 
This is an important and powerful critique of the intellectual project which the 
sociology of deviance represents. However, there is also a clear sense of normative 
disapproval in Sumner’s usage of the term ‘censure’ in the work making up this second 
strand, though the grounds for this are not fully articulated. He condemns the use of the 
criminal law as a nakedly ‘censuring’ practice and the depoliticising practices of censuring 
and blaming others, which he argues characterise contemporary neo-liberal societies: 
“It is producing the censorious society of proto-saints – an entropic entity with no 
goals other than the slander and defeat of the immediate enemy today… The censure 
floats free of restraint and has become as anonymously unattached as money.”12 
At the same time, he argues for the reinvigoration of a moral code that would censure the 
practices of the rich and powerful on the basis of a new kind of ethics, based on the building 
of new kinds of legitimacy.13 The ‘sociology of censure’ can thus describe either the general 
historical reconstruction of the sociology of deviance, or the more specific historical project 
of understanding the use of censure and punishment in neo-liberalism or late capitalism, or 
indeed the reconstructive ethical project hinted at in his more recent writings. 
The principal strength of the sociology of censures approach, in my view, is the focus 
on censuring practices rather than qualities of the conduct itself. Sumner’s is a non-
essentialist approach that demands that we look at the kinds of censure, the institutional 
forms that they take, the way that certain normative understandings are built up around these 
censures, and the way that these are linked to social institutions and power structures. This is 
exemplified by Sumner’s historical analysis of the sociology of deviancy ‘project’, but can 
and should be extended to other periods and areas. This kind of approach opens the path to a 
more systematic analysis of how values come to be organised in a certain way in institutions 
such as the criminal law so as to ask what is distinctive about censure through the criminal 
law. In Sumner’s more recent work he has introduced a normative dimension to this project, 
claiming also to see it as an attempt to develop a theory of “morality, democracy and justice” 
                                                 
10 Sumner, “Censure, Culture and Political Economy”, p.165. 
11 Sumner, Sociology of Deviance, p.310; Sumner, “Beyond”: “From deviance to censure is not just a shift in 
sociological theory, but also a change in the way societies operate” (p.174). 
12 Sumner, Sociology of Deviance, p.313. 
13 Sumner, “Beyond”: “There is certainly a need for a critical re-moralization of society” (p.174); “the censure 
and punishment of the bankers could be the starting point of a new moral order or at least the recognition of the 
idea and reality of the moral economy” (p.178). 
4 
 
– though the grounds for this remoralization, or its connection to the broader sociology of 
censure project, are only gestured at.14 
 
III. Censure and Sanctions 
This same period saw a parallel revival of interest in the idea of censure in criminal law 
theory. Beginning in the 1970s, Andreas von Hirsch was producing a body of work which 
challenged contemporary sentencing practices, in particular individualised treatment and 
indeterminate sentences, arguing that sentencing should be strictly proportional to the 
seriousness of the crime.15 This movement was in significant part motivated by the critique of 
the rehabilitative ideal which developed in the late 1960 and 1970s which identified harsh 
and indeterminate sentences as one of the major failings of penal-welfarism. This was driven 
by a liberal, rights-based, agenda – seeking to limit punishment by moving from a 
consequentialist to a non-consequentialist, retributive, justification for punishment. The aim 
was to punish less, focusing on not doing harm instead of seeking to do good through 
punishment.16 Doing justice to the accused and to the victims of crime was seen as more 
important than utilitarian concerns with crime prevention. Penal theory accordingly began to 
focus on questions of sentencing, seeing the reduction of discretion in sentencing as a way of 
addressing the abuses of some rehabilitative practices.  
Von Hirsch’s influential theory of punishment came to focus on the concept of 
censure, which he identified with the retributive justification of punishment. This was most 
clearly articulated in his book, Censure and Sanctions (1993).17 This took the form of an 
argument about the justification of punishment. He began this by arguing that censure was a 
form of blaming or condemnation that was “desert-oriented by nature”.18 It was desert-
oriented because on his account a person is entitled to condemn (punish) only if they have 
reason to believe that conduct is wrongful, and only to the extent of the wrongfulness of the 
conduct. Punishment which was not for wrongdoing, or whose harshness or severity 
exceeded the extent of the wrong committed was thus prima facie unjustified. However, he 
also argued that this form of moral address required to be supplemented with hard treatment 
(punishment) which would provide the offender with prudential reasons for obedience.19 
Thus, while there was a linkage between censure, as the general justifying aim of 
punishment, and a consequentialist concern that punishment was necessary to prevent crime, 
the sanction was to be understood primarily as a form of censure. Censure appealed to the 
offender as an agent as part of the process of holding them responsible, or calling them to 
account, for their conduct. It addressed, first, the victim, or the person who had been 
wronged, and was an acknowledgement of the wrong that had been done to them. Second, it 
addressed the wrongdoer(s) and it carried an expectation of some response from them or an 
acknowledgement of the wrongfulness of their conduct. And third, it addressed the wider 
community, communicating the disapproval of the wrongdoing and providing reasons for 
                                                 
14 Sociology of Deviance, p.304. See also “Beyond” p.174 calling for a major restatement of the criminal law 
based on a “democratization and rationalization of social censures”. 
15 See in particular Doing Justice. The Choice of Punishments (New York: Hill & Wang, 1976); Past or Future 
Crimes. Deservedness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1986). 
There is discussion of the development of his ideas in A Duff & D Garland, A Reader on Punishment (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1994) pp.112-4. 
16 See the discussion in S Cohen, “Guilt, Justice and Tolerance: Some Old Concepts for a New Criminology” in 
Against Criminology (London: Transaction, 1998) at pp.131ff. 
17 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996). See also AE Bottoms, “5 Puzzles in von Hirsch’s Theory of Punishment” in A 
Ashworth & M Wasik, Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998) esp. at pp.77-95. 
18 Censure and Sanctions, p.24. 
19 Censure and Sanctions, p.14; Duff & Garland, Reader, pp.112-3. 
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desistance from such conduct in future. Censure was thus “embodied in the prescribed 
sanction” because it was embedded in a complex relational structure of moral agency.20 
It is central to von Hirsch’s account that censure is communicative and expressive, 
seeing punishment as embodying a form of “social and symbolic communication” between 
offender, victim and the wider community.21 This, in itself, taps into a broader movement in 
moral philosophy in which it has been argued that the attribution of responsibility is 
relational, taking place within a broader network of actors and institutions. On this view 
responsibility should not be understood as a fundamental attribute of the actor (such as free 
will), but as rooted in social practices of answerability between agents and institutions. This 
seeks to ground the abstract concept of responsibility in social practices of holding ourselves 
and others to account.22 The very idea of censure thus implies both recognition of the moral 
agency of victims and perpetrators and a form of moral communication between the various 
participants. Censure is grounded in the community practices of calling to account and should 
be understood ideally as promoting a form of moral dialogue in the community. Censure thus 
has an intrinsic moral and symbolic structure which seeks both to address the wrongdoer 
about their past wrongdoing and to shape future conduct.23 This account of censure also has 
implications for the substantive criminal law.24 A legal censure must identify conduct that is 
wrongful and declare this publicly, and in advance – so that the addressee “should consider 
its wrongfulness (and not just the threat of adverse consequences) as reason to desist”.25 The 
criminal law’s claim to legitimate authority thus rests in part on the content of the norm (its 
wrongfulness) and in part on the modality of law. Criminal law is a form of regulation which 
addresses legal persons as moral agents. This is thus to identify something distinctive about 
criminal law which can distinguish it from other modes of crime control or regulation.26  
This is thus an account of censure which has considerable intellectual coherence and 
appeal, grounding the justification of punishment and criminal law in an account of 
individual moral agency and seeing censure as a particular way of identifying and responding 
to wrongful conduct. Its strength lies in the recognition of offenders as moral agents who are 
also always part of a wider political community, as well as its commitment to parsimony in 
punishment. But, these points also raise significant questions. Many of these concerns centre 
around the question of the legitimacy of censure practices.27 For von Hirsch legitimacy can 
appear to be internal to the concept of censure: if a wrongful act has been committed, and the 
penalty is not disproportionate to the wrong, then the censure is prima facie legitimate. The 
difficulty, though, is that the legitimacy of the criminal law and the criminal justice system 
depends not only on moral, or even legal, reasons but also on a wider range of political and 
social factors – and for an account that sees censure as authoritative expression of disapproval 
von Hirsch has remarkably little to say about structures of authority. This point can be 
                                                 
20 Censure and Sanctions, p.11. 
21 Although in his more recent writings he concedes that censure “generally involves authoritative expressions 
of disapproval”: see AP Simester & A von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs. On the Principles of 
Criminalisation (Abingdon: Hart Publishing, 2011) p.13. See also Bottoms, “5 Puzzles” p.86. cf. J Feinberg, 
“The Expressive Function of Punishment” (1965) 49 The Monist 397-423; RA Duff, Punishment, 
Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001). 
22 P Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment” in J Fischer & M Ravizza, Perspectives on Moral Responsibility 
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993); C Kutz, “Responsibility” in J Coleman et al, The Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004). 
23 See Duff, Punishment, at p.80. 
24 Simester & von Hirsch, Crimes, ch.1. 
25 Simester & von Hirsch, Crimes, p.11. 
26 Cf. Bottoms, “5 Puzzles”, pp.90-1 who is more concerned with the content or the source of the norm. It is not 
that these features are unimportant, but that he is not attending to the mode of responsibilization. 
27 A point made by Bottoms, “5 Puzzles”, pp.93-4 
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illustrated by considering the phenomenon of mass imprisonment in the United States.28 
Individual punishments may be legally valid, in the sense of imposed by legally constituted 
courts according to pre-established rules, and justified in terms of retribution or individual 
desert; the problem is that the system as a whole is criticised for illegitimacy because of over-
punishment and the disproportionate impact on certain ethnic communities. This broader 
issue is not something that can be addressed only by limiting the amount of punishment (for 
example, calling for proportionally shorter sentences, or challenging the idea of desert) 
because punishment is part of a larger system where issues of social inequality and the 
political use of the criminal law are central.29 This is also linked to a further point, which is 
that it is implicit in this type of expressive account that punishment should articulate shared 
wrongs which encapsulate or reflect the views of the “community” or the wider society. The 
theory assumes the existence of moral consensus, or at least a potential for consensus, both in 
the identification of ‘wrongs’ and in the idea that criminal justice system actors are justified 
in acting on behalf of the community.30 The problem, though, is that the evidence in support 
of the existence of this kind of moral consensus about wrongdoing, or shared trust in the 
criminal justice system, is limited – and indeed that this kind of trust can be weakened by 
policies such as mass incarceration.31 The conceptual neatness of the theory arguably breaks 
down when it comes into contact with the actual practices of criminal justice systems or, 
indeed, actual social practices.32 
 
IV. Rethinking Censure 
On the face of it there is little in common between these two accounts of censure. Von 
Hirsch’s account is the epitome of an approach rejected by Sumner: an individualist account 
articulated in terms of a claim to universal values, which pays little heed to social context or 
power relations. Indeed, far from being an expression of power, the concept of censure, on 
von Hirsch’s account, is viewed as a means of controlling or limiting power. Likewise, from 
von Hirsch’s perspective, Sumner’s account of censure might appear to lack normative 
grounding, and give insufficient weight to the significance of law as a particular kind of 
censuring practice. Both are universalising, but in hugely different ways. Von Hirsch’s 
account seeks to identify the normative core of censuring practices in an account of moral 
agency; Sumner originally sees the concept of censure as a morally neutral term that will 
allow us to analyse a range of different censuring practices. While von Hirsch goes back to 
‘classical’ theories of criminal law and moral philosophy to focus on questions of normative 
justification, Sumner is developing a meta-theoretical account of the political economy of law 
and crime. How, then, are we to think about the relation between the two ideas of censure? 
Are the two simply incommensurable, in spite of the common terminology?33 At one level I 
think this is certainly the case for the reasons set out above. However, in this final part of the 
                                                 
28 M Alexander, The New Jim Crow. Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: The New 
Press, 2010); D Garland (ed), Mass Imprisonment. Social Causes and Consequences (London: Sage, 2001) 
29 V Chiao, “Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment” forthcoming Criminal Law and Philosophy 
(DOI 10.1007/s11572-015-9378-x). 
30 See e.g. Censure and Sanctions, p.5 expressing a kind of Rawlsian view about a system of sanctions that all 
members of the community might in principle agree to. 
31 See e.g. C Muller & D Schrage, “Mass Imprisonment and Trust in the Law” (2014) 651 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political Science 139-58. 
32 See L Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law. Criminalization and Civil Order (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2016), pp.103-15. 




paper I want to explore some possible ways of developing a common ground between the two 
accounts. 
One possible starting place for doing this is Stan Cohen’s paper “On Guilt, Justice and 
Tolerance” which, like both Sumner and von Hirsch, was responding to the collapse of the 
rehabilitative ideal and the breakdown of the post-war consensus in the 1970s. In this paper 
Cohen argued that an impasse had been reached: the ‘new’ or radical criminology was 
increasingly focused on the labelling processes, rather than a supposed underlying reality of 
‘crime’ but, in doing so, failed to respond to concerns that people were the victims of crime 
or to recognise that (at least some) offenders deserved to be punished. By contrast Cohen 
acknowledged that part of the political appeal of the ‘back to justice’ movement, represented 
by people like von Hirsch, was that their critique of criminal justice rested on an appeal to 
normative concepts such as guilt and justice. Cohen accordingly challenged critical 
criminologists to address and articulate the normative presuppositions of their own work in 
order to re-engage with the political relevance of their work.34 The central claim that Cohen 
makes is that: 
“the interests of the state lie in prohibiting certain action and punishing those 
responsible for this action. The questions these interests raise (and always have) about 
justice, tolerance, morality, guilt, and responsibility are only now being considered in 
the new criminologies. I believe it is only by putting them firmly on the agenda that 
the connections with criminal justice politics can be made.”35 
For Cohen the immediate question was one of developing a new kind of criminal justice 
politics, such that radical criminology did not place itself in the position of the outright 
rejection of all forms of regulation or social control. In other words, he argued that 
criminologists should avoid a complete moral relativism, that saw all labels as arbitrarily 
imposed, and should instead interrogate the meanings of concepts such as guilt, responsibility 
and justice. These, he argued, were not necessarily only abstract conceptual building blocks 
cut off from any social reality, nor ideological cover for the naked exercise of power, but 
could also articulate socially meaningful practices in terms of which the conduct of social 
actors and institutions could be made judged. This involved the further recognition that an 
institution such as the criminal law (or something like it) was necessary to most (if not all) 
societies, as even socially just societies would require some sort of regulation of conduct and 
a system for allocating blame and making judgments.36 The point, therefore, for him was not 
to reject the criminal law (or an account of guilt and justice) outright, but to locate the 
discussion of legal practices and concepts in a broader critique by understanding how the 
institution had developed and whose interests it served, but also why the law continued to 
have a broad social appeal and to be a meaningful way of understanding and judging 
conduct.37 This project, it seems to me, is no closer to fulfilment than when Cohen wrote. 
However, by bringing together some of the insights from both accounts of censure, it is 
possible to outline how Cohen’s basic insight might be developed. 
 Our starting point must be Cohen’s claim that it is necessary to reflect on the question 
of the sense in which a person accused of having committed a crime might be guilty. This 
                                                 
34 In S Cohen, Against Criminology (London: Transaction Books, 1988). Some similar issues were raised in G 
Pearson, The Deviant Imagination. Psychiatry, Social Work and Social Change (London: Macmillan, 1975) 
cautioning against the romanticization of deviance and recognizing that there will be a need for moral 
judgments. For a more recent discussion see S Cottee, “Judging Offenders: the moral implications of 
criminological theories” in M Cowburn et al, Values in Criminology and Community Justice (Bristol: Policy 
Press, 2013). 
35 Cohen, Against Criminology, p.117. 
36 Cohen, Against Criminology, p.120. 
37 Ibid p.133 “locating justice model in broader critique and program”. 
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clearly is not a straightforward question to answer, as we should not simply fall back, as 
many moral philosophers do, on our supposed or assumed moral intuitions or emotions about 
the wrongfulness of conduct or the meaning of guilt.38 These are socially constructed and 
cannot be treated as though they give us any sort of direct access to truth. Guilt is a complex 
matter involving subjective feelings and judgments as well as being embedded in the long 
history of our legal, religious and moral institutions.39 One element of the reflection on guilt 
is the need to engage with the practices, the motives and the characters of those who break 
social norms – to decide, in Becker’s terms, whose side we are on.40 This also relates to what 
Cottee has called the ‘moral framing’ of offenders within criminology, or the need for a 
reflexive criminology that is capable of articulating the moral implications of its explanatory 
models.41 A further dimension, though, is the need for criminologists (and criminal lawyers) 
to engage with the systems and institutions that identify and condemn offenders – something 
that more directly confronts Sumner’s deployment of the concept of censure. Guilt is a moral 
concept, but it is also a legal concept, and while legal conceptions of guilt are related to moral 
conceptions, they also operate within, and are shaped by, a distinct set of institutions such as 
the criminal law.42 It is thus important to understand how the criminal law operates not only 
as a system of blame allocation but also as a system that gives meaning to certain forms of 
conduct. This is a matter of understanding the ways that it identifies forms of conduct to be 
censured, differentiates between different actions and actors, and the terms in which, and 
procedures through which, it condemns and punishes. And crucially, of course, it also means 
that we need to address the question of the sense in which certain forms of censure or 
punishment are deserved. 
Neo-classical accounts of criminal law and punishment, such as that advocated by von 
Hirsch, have unquestionably taken the question of guilt seriously. Indeed, the commitment to 
deserved punishment in his theory was based, as we have seen, on the claim that the degree 
of deserved punishment could be calibrated to the degree of culpability – that censure was 
intrinsically related to guilt. This was articulated with the aim of reducing punishment 
though, as many commentators have pointed out, the adoption of the justice-model was 
accompanied in practice by a relentless increase in the lengths of sentences and the numbers 
of those imprisoned in many jurisdictions.43 At the very least, this kind of retributive theory 
does not seem to have restrained punishment as it originally promised to do. A significant 
weakness of the theory, though, has been that this account of desert in punishment was not 
matched by a developed understanding of the concept of crime – that is to say that it largely 
took existing institutional structures for granted. It was, to this extent, a theory of punishment 
without an adequate theory of crime, and thus as a theory of censure it could have only 
limited impact because it had little to say about the justification for the criminalization of 
particular crimes or, more broadly, little understanding of practices of criminalisation in 
modern society. In order for the normative critique of punishment to bite, I would argue that 
it is necessary additionally to develop a social theory of censures, along the lines set out by 
Sumner, that engages with the forms of particular censures, the kinds of knowledge that they 
produce, and the interests that they serve. Crime and criminal law, in other words, are not 
                                                 
38 See L Farmer, “Criminal Wrongs in Historical Perspective” in RA Duff et al, The Boundaries of the Criminal 
Law (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010). 
39 See e.g. S Ashenden & J Brown, “Guilt: Introduction” (2014) 43:1 Economy & Society 1-18. 
40 H Becker, “Whose Side Are We On?” (1967) 14 Social Problems 239-47 
41 Cottee, “Judging Offenders” pp.17-18. See now S Armstrong et al, Reflexivity and Criminal Justice. 
Intersections of Policy, Practice and Research (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
42 C Thornhill, “Guilt and the Origins of Modern Law” (2014) 43:1 Economy & Society 103-35. 




neutral conduits between moral values and punishing practices but are intrinsically linked to 
the development of the modern state and to the particular project of social stabilisation and 
pacification that it drives.44  
 One of the central features of the development of the modern criminal law has been a 
culture of individualism, expressed in the central concept of criminal responsibility.45 Modern 
liberal criminal law individualises, and there is a justified fear that it is consequently overly 
reductive of complex social relationships, and that its focus on rational decision making 
reduces everything to a utility-maximising logic.46 The logic of individual responsibility in 
the criminal law has thus always sat awkwardly with sociologically oriented criminological 
explanations which have linked criminal conduct to structural and cultural explanations of the 
determinants of conduct.47 From this perspective criminal law is easily treated as a state 
institution that legitimises the exercise of class power, and it is then difficult, as Cohen 
pointed out, to negotiate a path between a kind of social determinism that denies agency and 
a recognition of free will that seems to concede the legitimacy of the criminal law. An 
alternative way of approaching responsibility in criminal law, however, is to distinguish, as 
von Hirsch’s account of censure does, between a kind of methodological individualism, 
which sees individual agency (or free will) as a fixed feature of human nature, and the kind of 
account which sees responsibility as rooted in social practices of holding others to account.48 
This kind of account sees responsibility as primarily relational, linked to different kinds of 
social processes and institutions through which members of particular communities are called 
on to answer for their conduct. The advantage of such an approach is that criminal 
responsibility is no longer seen as reflecting an underlying state of affairs (free will) which is 
antithetical to social theory, but is instead “rooted in the practices of defining the scope of 
responsibilities and of holding to account by the legal institution.”49 It is thus possible to 
distinguish between the practice of holding others responsible (censure in general), and the 
particular institutional forms that this takes. In other words, it is possible critically to assess 
particular practices of responsibilization in the modern criminal law, while still recognising 
that responsibility practices more generally are a fundamental feature of social life. 
 The question of criminal responsibility also requires us to address the question, raised 
by von Hirsch, of the specific characteristics of the criminal law as a censuring practice. A 
sociology of censures must acknowledge that there are different kinds of censuring practices 
and explore what it is that makes them distinctive. A key feature of criminal responsibility is 
that it creates a reasonably static object of legal attribution and application (the legal subject) 
which allows the articulation of norms capable of general application.50 That is to say that the 
institution of law posits that those to whom personality is attributed are those capable of 
acting in conformity to norms and being held responsible for breaches of those norms.51 This 
is the basis for legal censuring practices, and while this might be criticised, as we noted 
above, as a kind of abstraction from social realities, presupposing the subject as a responsible 
agent in this way has further implications for the form or modality of law. Rules must take 
                                                 
44 R Reiner, Crime (Cambridge: Polity, 2016) pp.2-3; Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law, ch.3. 
45 N Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility. Ideas, Interests and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2016). 
46 For the classic account see G Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” (1968) 76 Jnl. Of 
Political Economy 169-217. 
47 See e.g. the discussion in Cottee, “Judging Offenders” supra n.34. 
48 See the discussion in Kutz, supra n.22, at pp.552-8. 
49 See Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law, supra n.32, p.169. While writers like von Hirsch argue that 
this reflects a fundamental or underlying structure of moral agency (thus bringing it back to a kind of 
methodological individualism), I argue here that this is not a necessary feature of this account. 
50 Thornhill, “Guilt and the Origins of Modern Law” supra n.42.  
51 N MacCormick, Institutions of Law, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007) p.89. 
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the form of general norms directed at and capable of being understood and followed by 
persons deemed to possess the necessary capacities; and the attribution of responsibility for 
the breach of a norm should extend only to those who are recognized as possessing such 
capacities.52 The criminal law, in short, attributes a unique kind of agency to its subjects, and 
in doing so is itself subject to certain constraints. Laws should take the form of rules of 
general application, punishment should only be imposed on those found guilty under legal 
procedures, and only to the extent of their guilt, and so on. This is not to suggest that criminal 
law always meets these aspirations, for this is unfortunately not the case, nor that the law is 
not used for instrumental ends or to serve the interests of particular social groups; but where 
it departs from these standards, applies them in a partial way, or directly prefers the interests 
of one class over another, it is open to challenge and undermines its own legitimacy. This 
might be viewed as a restatement of the point made so elegantly by EP Thompson in the 
context of his discussion of repressive eighteenth-century criminal laws: 
“It is true that in history the law can be seen to mediate and to legitimize existent class 
relations. Its forms and procedures may crystallize those relations and mask ulterior 
injustice. But this mediation, through the forms of law, is something quite distinct 
from the exercise of unmediated force. The forms and rhetoric of law acquire a 
distinct identity which may, on occasion, inhibit power and afford some protection to 
the powerless.”53 
This is important because both accounts of censure assume that it is justifiable to 
punish (presumably through law) genuinely harmful acts. There is, though, a crucial gap 
between the two accounts of censure, in that while von Hirsch’s account assumes a 
community of interests which has reasonably settled understandings of wrongs and harms, 
Sumner advances a powerful critique of censuring practices in neo-liberal society and argues 
that there is a need for a new ethical code to censure the harmful practices of the wealthy and 
powerful. This, once again, brings in the question of the range of censuring practices, but it is 
not only a matter of the sociology of censure, but also of the social legitimacy of censuring 
practices or, more narrowly, the normative basis of criminalization. The normative basis of 
Sumner’s critique is based, at least in part, on the relative degree of social harmfulness of 
certain types of conduct and on the continuing social exclusion of certain groups or 
communities – an exclusion that is reinforced by the practices of the criminal justice system. 
In pointing to the illegitimacy of neo-liberal censure, it appeals to the possibility of a different 
social basis for legitimacy. But this is where more work needs to be done, for if the 
limitations of von Hirsch’s account of moral community are clear, we should be wary about 
replacing this with the claim to the existence of another, morally superior, community. The 
claim is perhaps better understood in a political register as a matter of opening up debate 
about the political legitimacy of the criminal law. A theory of censure should not be allowed 




The concept of censure, as developed in different ways, in the work of Sumner and von 
Hirsch, has enormous potential – though each of the accounts has its own limitations – and 
this potential might be greater yet if we are able to draw on the strengths of both theories. In 
this chapter I have tried to show some way in which there is a common ground between them, 
                                                 
52 Kutz, “Responsibility” supra n.22, p.567. cf. L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Revised edn.) (New Haven: Yale 
UP, 1969) pp.181-4; K Rundle, Forms Liberate (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012). 
53 EP Thompson, Whigs and Hunters. The Origins of the Black Act (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977) p.266. 
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and to offer some suggestions as to ways that this common ground might be developed, 
bringing criminology and criminal law theory into a new kind of dialogue.  
 
